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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15150

-vsLORRAINE HUNTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant's
motion in arrest of judgment and for leave to withdraw her plea
of guilty.

The motion was denied by the Honorable John F.

Wahlquist, Judge in the District Court of the Second Judicial
District, in and for the County of Weber.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On October 15, 1973, appellant pleaded guilty to
an amended information charging her with obtaining merchandise
by false representation, exceeding $100.00, in violation of
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-20-8 (1953), as amended.

The plea was

accepted by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Judge of the Second Judicial District.
subsequentl:1 sentenced
on probation.

on

Appellant was

r-:ovell'ber 5, lq73, etn'1 placed

The special conditions of the probation

agreement were that appellant serve sixty days in the
Weber County Jail and not deal in any form of credit.
Appellant was subsequently returned to the
court in February of 1974 for violating the terms of
her probation and was committed to the Weber County Jail.
Thereafter she was transferred to the Utah State Prison
for a 90-day diagnostic evaluation.

Upon completion of

the evaluation, the Division of Corrections recorrunended
that probation be denied.

Pending pronouncement of the

final sentence, appellant was released on her.own
recognizance and fled the State.

She subsequently

returned to this jurisdiction and was arrested on
March 14, 1977.
On March 21, 1977, a hearing was held before
Judge Wahlquist and appellant made a motion in arrest of
judgment and for leave to withdraw her plea of guilty.
The motion was denied, and the court placed appellant
in the Utah State Hospital in Provo for a further
sentence evaluation.

pr~

It is fro111 the denial of the motion

in arrest of judgment and for leave to withdraw a plea
of guilty that appellant appeals.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the
Second Judicial District Court denying appellant's
motions affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During October of 1972 appellant purchased
a 1972 Chevrolet Station Wagon from Lyle's Used Cars
in Ogden, Utah.

The purchase price was $3,995.00.

At the time of sale, appellant paid $1,000.00 down and
filled out a credit application making certain false
representations.

The balance of the purchase price

was financed by Lyle's Used Cars through the Bank of
Utah over a period of 36 months at the rate of $107.03
per month.

Appellant purchased insurance for her car

under a name different from the. one she used to purchase
the car (Transcript of Hearing, p. S).
Appellant received her payment book and made
the first three payments.

She thereafter moved to

Las Vegas, Nevada, in order to obtain employment, but
was unsuccessful.

She was also unable to obtain welfare

because of her non-residence and thus discontinued to
make payments on the automobile.

-3-
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On or about the 11th day of July, 1973, the
Bank of Utah caused the automobile in question to be
repossessed in Las Vegas, and further filed a complaint
with the Weber County Attorney's Office charging the
appellant with obtaining merchandise by false rePresent<tion in violation of Utah Code Ann.
as amended.

§

76-20-8

(1953),

Appellant was subsequently arrested in

Nevada on a Utah warrant and was extradited to Utah
where she was incarcerated in the Weber County Jail
on or about the 20th day of September, 1973.

She was

unable to raise bail, having been refused O.R. releae,
and remained incarcerated.
The automobile was subsequently returned to
Utah and sold by the Bank of Utah.
Appellant was arraigned on September 20, 1973,
the Court having appointed Maurice Richards of Ogden,
Utah, as counsel for the appellant (R.8).

On October

10, 1973, appellant pleaded not guilty at her arraignment in District Court (R.12).

On the day of the tr~~

October 15, 1973, she pleaded guilty to an amended
information (R.13).

Apparently the county attorney

offered to recommend that appellant be placed on probatii
in return for a guilty plea (Transcript of Hearing for
Imposition of Sentence and Motion of Counsel, P· 2- 3 ).
(See also R.14.)
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On November 5, 1973, appellant was placed
under the supervision of the Adult Probation and Parole
Department and was ordered to serve a
days in the Weber County Jail.

ter~

of sixty

She was also ordered

not to deal in any form of credit (R.14).
Appellant served her sixty days and was
released on December 21, 1973 (R.17).
On February 15, 1974, appellant appeared
before Judge Wahlquist to show cause why her probation
should not be revoked (R.18,21).

An affidavit had

been filed alleging that appellant had 9harged gas
at a Texaco Station in Ogden under a fictitious name
(R.20).

Another affidavit charged appellant with

petty theft, to-wit:

stealing two cartons of cigarettes

in Wangsgard Motel (R.23).

To these alleged violations

she pleaded guilty (R.18,48-54).
Appellant was committed by Judge Wahlquist
on February 15, 1974, to the Board of Corrections at
the Utah State Prison for a 90-day evaluation (R.24).
She was returned to the court on May 14, 1974, for
sentencing, which was continued to May 20, 1974.

She

was released on her own recognizance in the meantime.
Appellant thereafter left the State of Utah, not to
return until 1977.

On May 24, 1974, a bench warrant

nsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Serv
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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was issued against the appellant (R.28).
On March 14, 1977, appellant was arrested
by the Weber County authorities and incarcerated in
the Weber County Jail.
On March 21, 1977, appellant was again
committed to the Board of Corrections at the Utah
State Prison and at the Utah State Hospital for a
90-day psychiatric evaluation pursuant to an order
by Judge Wahlquist (R.37).

On the same day, appellant

filed a motion in arrest of judgment and for leave
to withdraw plea of guilty, which motion was denied by
Judge Wahlquist (R. 40).

The denial of appellant's motion

was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, and is the subjec'
of this brief.

On May 2, 1977, appellant wai releas~oo

her own recognizance pending the outcome of the appeal
by order of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on
May 2, 1977.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UTAH S'l'ATUTORY LAW PRECLUDES THE
WITHDRAWAL OF A GUILTY PLEA AFTER
JUDGMENT.
Appellant pleaded guilty to a charge of obtaining
merchandise by false representation in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-20-8 (1953), on October 15, 1973 (R. 13).
Judgment was entered in November 5, 1973 (R. 14).

on

March 21, 1977, some 4 and 1/3 years later, appellant through
counsel filed a Motion in Arrest of Judgment and For Leave
to Withdraw Plea of Guilty (R. 36).

Said motion was denied

(Transcript of Hearing for Imposition of Sentence), and this
appeal was filed subsequently by appellant (R. 41).
Before addressing the merits of appellant's motion
in Points II and IV, respondent respectfully submits that
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3

(1953), appellant is

precluded from withdrawing her plea of guilty.

The statute

states in part:
"The court may at any time before
judgment, upon a plea of guilty, permit
it to be withdrawn and a plea of not
guilty substituted."
(Emphasis added)
Unless the emphasized portion of the above statute is
disregarded or considered superfluous,the plain impact of
its language is to allow guilty pleas to be withdrawn only before

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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judgment.

Similarily, Section 77-34-1, Utah Code Ann.

(1953) also precludes appellant's Motion in Arrest of
Judgment.

That particular section states in

par~:

"The motion in arrest of
judgment must be made before or
at the time the defendant is called
for judgment."
(Emphasis added).
Seemingly, then, without further consideration of
the merits of appellant's motion, such an attempt to have
the judgment arrested and guilty plea withdrawn and substitut,
with a not guilty plea should be dismissed as untimely.
Further discussion and review of similar statutes in other
states (infra) support respondent's view.
The Utah Supreme Court has reviewed on several
occasions cases in which defendants have attempted to withdra,
guilty pleas following judgment, but has addressed itself
to issues involving abuse of discretion rather than to the
issue of untimeliness of the motion itself.
In State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d 825
(1932), the defendant entered a plea of guilty to the
charge of murder in the second degree and was sentenced to
an indeterminate term of imprisonment in the Utah State
Prison.

The defendant was released on a writ of habeas

corpus because the indeterminate sentence was not authorized
by law.

Upon his release, the defendant was immediately

arrested and returned to the district court for the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

imposition of a proper sentence.

The defendant objected

to the jurisdiction of the district court, and without
waivin1 that objection, insisted on withdrawing his former
plea of guilty as a matter of right.

The district court

denied the motion, and sentenced the defendant according
to law.

The Utah Supreme icourt affirmed on appeal in a

lengthy opinion directed largely to the question of the
district court's jurisdiction.

On the issue of withdrawal

of the guilty plea, the Court stated that the statute was
permissive and not mandatory, that the trial court's refusal
to allow withdrawal would only be reversed upon a showing
of an abuse of discretion, and that no abuse had been shown.
The question of the timeliness of the motion was not addressed,
presumably because the initial sentence was held void and
the motion was therefore "before judgment."
In State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671
(1963) , this Court considered the question of whether a
lower court had corrunitted error in refusing to allow a
defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty after sentence had
been pronounced.

This Court concluded that an abuse of

discretion had not been shown and affirmed the lower court.
On the question of whether the motion had been timely made,
the Court stated:

-9-
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"Were it not for the holding
in State v. Lee Lim, supra, it would
be the writer's personal opinion that
coram nobis should be the court remedy
ir: Utah.
(See State v. Telavern, 7G
Ariz. 183, 261 P.2d 997, and People
v. Wade, 53 Col. 2d 322, 1 Cal. Rptr.
683, 348 P.2d 116)." 378 P.2d at 672
Judge Jones did not state why'he felt the Lee Lim decision
controlled the result in Plum.
In Egan v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 143, 499 P.2d 286
(1972), defendant appealed to this Court from a decision of
the District Court denying his petition for a writ of habea~
corpus.

In his petition, he alleged that the trial court

had erred by refusing to permit him to change his plea
after sentence had been pronounced.

Defendant contended

among other things that he had asked his counsel to request
the trial court to permit him to change his plea to one of
not guilty.

In dismissing defendant's claim, this Court

was unable to address itself to the issue of timeliness
of such a request due to the fact that the record did not
reveal whether defendant had applied to the trial court for
permission to withdraw his guilty plea either before or
after sentence was pronounced.
Subsequently, in State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129
(Utah 1976), this Court again had the opportunity to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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address itself to the issue of whether a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea is untimely if made subsequent to judgment.
The Court again refused to allow such a change of plea
following sentencing, but on the grounds that an abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court had not been
shown.
The final two cases which have been heard by this
Court involving motions to set aside guilty pleas following
sentencing were State v. Soper, 559 P.2d 951 (Utah 1977),
and State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah

1978).

In Soper,

the defendant became involved in a plea bargaining process
between himself and two separate jurisdictions within the
State.

There occurred a breach of the plea bargain in one

jurisdiction, but this breach was not called to the attention
of his defense counsel or the court in either jurisdiction
until some eight months after the breach occurred and five
months following sentencing.

The Supreme Court dismissed

the appellant's contentions, but again on the grounds that
no abuse of discretion had been shown.

The Court did add

however that one seeking to set aside a final order such as
a sentence in a criminal case has the burden of producing
convincing proof of a fact which constitutes a legal ground
for setting aside such a sentence:
"A motion to set aside a plea
after sentencing is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial
court. Unless the allegations and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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proof 6f facts have the effect
of requiring the trial court, as
a matter of law, to grant the ~
motion, no abuse of discretion has
been shown."
599 P.2d at 953, 954.
(Emphasis added).
In Harris, supra, defendant's attempt to withdraw
his guilty plea following an unfavorable sentence was
rejected by this Court on the basis that no abuse of
discretion had been shown in the trial court's refusal to
grant the defendant's motion.
From an examination of the above authorities, it
appears that the question of the timeliness of a motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty after judgment and sentence has
never been squarely put to this Court, nor has this Court
ever held that a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty after
judgment was properly granted.
Respondent therefore urges this Court to accept
the rule embodied in Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3

(1953),

and to deny appellant's request to withdraw her plea of
guilty as not timely.

To do so would be in line with

several courts of other states which have held that statutes
similar to Utah's only allow withdrawal of guilty pleas
before judgment.
p. 2d 888

State v. Churton, 9 Ariz.

App. 16, 448

(1968); State v. Rinehart, 253 Iowa 1132, 125 N.W.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided-12by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2d 242, 245 (1963); McConnell v. People, 157 Colo. 235,
402 P.2d 75, 77

(1965); and People v. Grand, 16 Cal. App.

3rd 27, 93 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1971).
Appellant cites two Colorado cases in support
of her argument. Champion v. People,124 Colo. 253, 236
P.2d 127 (1951); Gearhart v. People, 113 Colo. 9, 154 P.2d
47 (1944).

It should be noted that in Gearhart,

for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty was denied.

a motion
In the

Champion case, the Colorado Supreme Court allowed defendant's
guilty plea to be withdrawn because, among other reasons.,
defendant

was not represented by counsel when he pled

guilty, he did not understand the nature of the charges
brought against him, and he did not understand the significance
of pleading guilty.

In 1964, however, in the case of

Glaser v. People, 155 Colo. 504, 395 P.2d 461 (1964),
the Colorado Supreme Court held that Rule 32(e) of the
Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibited the withdrawal
1
of a guilty plea after sentencing.
The implication of
1

Rule 32(e) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides as follows:
" . . • A motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty . . . may be made only before sentence
is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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this Rule was again upheld in the later cases of McCon:-iell v.
People, supra; Bradley v. People, 485 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1971);
and People v. Banks, 545 P.2d 1356 (Colo. 1976).

In~

plea of guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court where the motion to withdraw is filed before sentencin;.
The Court, quoting from Glaser v. People, supra, reasoned
as follows:
'"[t]here is no ambiguity in
the rule [Crim. P. 32(e)] as
adopted by this court.
In plain
language it says that a motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty may be
made only before sentence is imposed.
Trial courts accept pleas
of guilty to crimes after assurance
that the defendant understands the
consequences of that plea. The rule
contended for by counsel for defendant
would require that defendant also be
satisfied with, and approve of, the
consequences actually imposed by the
court.
"
Examination of the cases heretofore cited, as well
as a plain and simple reading of Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3
(1953),leads to one inescapable conclusion - that finality
of judgments should be accorded recognition and an accused
should not be allowed to gamble with the Court's time and
power.

An accused should not be permitted to withdraw a

guilty plea simply because the consequences turn out to be
less favorable than when the plea was voluntarily and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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intelligently made, particularly when the plea was tendered
well over four years earlier.

Respondent thus submits that

th2 motion tendered by appellant in the case at bar was
properly denied as untimely, and asks that this Court so hold.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HER GUILTY
PLEA.
Appellant, having pled guilty to the offense with
which she had been charged and thereby sentenced, returned
involuntarily to the District Court approximately four and
one-third years later and sought to withdraw her guilty
plea.

She has seemingly taken a "shotgun" approach in

stating the grounds by which she feels her guilty plea
should be withdrawn and a not guilty plea substituted.

In

her brief, she makes a flat allegation that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying her motion, but does not
give any specific examples or incidents as to how or why
she may have been prejudiced.

She does allege in Points

II and III of her brief that she was denied effective
assistance of counsel and that her plea was illicited through
duress.

Quite a substantial portion of her argument alleges

that "new evidence" has been

uncovered, which, if known at

the time of her plea, may have provided her with a defense
to the crime to which she pleaded guilty.
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Appellant has more or less "lumped" her allegation'
together without giving specific examples or details of her
alleged points of error.

Respondent will, however, atte~t

to treat each allegation separately as far as possible for
the sake of expedience, clarity, and hopefully the convenience of this Court.
Appellant has alleged that her motion to withdru
her guilty plea should have been granted by the lower court,
and in so refusing there existed an abuse of discretion.
The law in Utah is extremely clear on this point.

As far

back as 1932 when this Court decided State v. Lee Lim, 79
Utah 68, 7 P. 2d 825 (1932), the position of this Court has
consistently been that a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and the trial court's decision can only be reversed where
an abuse of discretion has been demonstrated.

State v.

Larson, 560 P.2d 335 (Utah, 1977), State v. Forsyth, 560
P.2d 337

(Utah 1977).

This principle has recently been

reaffirmed by this Court in the case of State v. Harris, 581
P.2d 450
2

(Utah 1978).

2

For other cases holding that Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3
(1953) confere a discretionary power upon the trial c~ur
to allow or disallow the change of a plea, and such d~s·
cretion will not be interferred with unless an abuse 1:
shown, see the following:
State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 124
(Utah 1977); State v. Olafson, 567 P.2d 156 (Utah 1971;1
State v. Gotschall, 570 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1977); ~
Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976).
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~n determing whether this Court will find that a

trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion
to set aside a judgment and allow a guilty plea to be withdrawn, a test has been set forth.

In State v. Soper, 559

P.2d 951 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court, in denying
petitioner's claim that his motion to vacate his plea of
guilty should have been sustained, held that no abuse of
discretion claim will be upheld unless facts are presented,
which,as a matter of law, require that the trial court
grant such a motion:
"A sentence in a criminal case is
a final judgment, and one seeking to set
aside such a final order has the burden
of producing convincing proof of a fact
which constitutes a legal ground for
setting aside such a sentence. A motion
to set aside a plea after sentencing is
addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. Unless the allegations and
proof of facts have the effect of requiring the trial court, as a matter of
law, to grant the motion, no abuse of
discretion has been shown." 559 P.2d
at 953, 954.
{Emphasis added).
The Soper case is significant in that it parallels
the case at bar in two respects:

(1) in Soper the defendant

remained silent, not moving for his guilty plea to be withdrawn until nine months after the plea was entered, and five
months after sentencing.

In the present case, appellant

remained silent well over four years following her guilty
plea and sentencing;

(2) in both Soper and the present case
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the motions to withdraw guilty pleas were made after
sentencing.
It thus follows from Soper that appellant must
allege and set forth facts which, as a matter of law, would
require granting of her motion to vacate the guilty plea.
Such a burden rests entirely upon her shoulders, and there
is nothing in the record to substantiate her allegations
of an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
It is noteworthy that this Court in Soper, when
referring to the portion of its opinion wherein the burden
of producing facts constituting legal grounds for setting
aside judgments is placed on the petitioner, uses the term
"convincing proof" in describing such facts.

Perhaps a

degree of proof such as "convincing" or "clear and convincing" is required.
242, 526 P.2d 250

See People v. Cruz, 116 ca·l. Rptr.

(1974).

Be that as it may, appellant

has not met such a standard, nor has appellant carried the
burden of producing any facts to substantiate her allegation;
as required by State v. Soper, supra, and State v. Larson,
supra.
In order for appellant's motion for withdrawal
of her guilty plea to have been granted, it would seem
that the plea itself must be made to appear void or
defective because pf one of the reasons set forth in ~
Plum, supra:
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"It has not been made to appear
that the accused entered his plea
of guilty in ig~orance of his rights,
or that he was immature or illiterate
~r that he w~s influenced unduly or '
improperly either by hope or fear,
or that his plea was entered by
reason of mistake, misapprehension
or undue influence.
378 P.2d
at 673.
The record does not substantiate a claim by appellant
based upon any of the foregoing reasons.

In her brief,

she has alleged no facts tending to show an abuse of
discretion.

A.
THERE HAS BEEN NO SHOWING, THAT
APPELLANT'S PLEA WAS INVOLUNTARY.
There have been no facts set forth by appellant
in the record which would indicate that her plea cf guilty
was anything but voluntarily and intelligently given.

The

record indicates that, having been advised of her rights by
Judge Wahlquist, appellant pleaded guilty (R. 13).
had pleaded not guilty five days earlier (R. 12).

She
Her plea

of guilty was apparently entered with the understanding that
the prosecutor would recommend probation at the sentencing
hearing.

The court sentenced appellant to serve 60 days

in jail and thereafter to be placed on probation.

The plea

bargain was fulfilled, and appellant does not challenge her
guilty plea on the basis that the plea bargain was breached.
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It is noteworthy, however, that under Utah law, even if the
trial court had not followed the prosecutor's sentencing
recommendation, the c;uilty plea would have been valid and
a motion to withdraw the plea based upon abuse of discretion
by the trial court would have been frivolous.

State v.

Plum, supra; State v. Forsyth, supra; State v. Garfield,
supra; State v. Harris, supra; Guglielmetti v. Turner, 27 Utah
2d 3 41 , 4 9 6 p • 2d 2 61 ( 19 72 ) .
If appellant is to have the guilty plea vacated
as being involuntary or unintelligently given, several
presumptions must be overcome.

It has been held that when

a defendant enters a plea of guilty upon the advice of a
competent attorney, the plea is deemed to be intelligently
entered.

Guglielmettiv. Turner, supra, at 496 P.2d 262.

In Mayne v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 195, 468 P.2d 369 (1970),
this Court said that a plea of guilty is presumed to be
voluntary and knowledgeable.

Similarly, the Arizona

Supr~e

Court in State v. Mccallister, 107 Ariz. 143, 483 P.2d 558
(1971), stated:
".
, a presumption exists that
when a defendant who is represented by
counsel changes his plea at trial from
not guilty to guilty as a result of
plea bargaining, he does so with full
knowledge of the facts and consequences
thereof.
State v. Martinez, 102 Ariz. 215,
427 P. 2d 533 (1967)."
483 P. 2d at 560.
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It cannot be said that the prosecution or the
trial judge reneged on their portion of the plea bargain
in the present case.

If anything, appellant violated her

part of the agreement when, after being released from jail
and put on probation as agreed, she violated the terms of
her probation.

Her guilty plea was accepted in good faith

after having been tendered in good faith.
by the record in this case.

This is supported

Respondent therefore submits

that appellant cannot now claim that:1erplea was anything
other than voluntary and intelligent.
B.
THERE HAS BEEN NO SHOWING THAT
APPELLANT'S PLEA WAS THE PRODUCT
OF INEFFECTIVE OR INCOMPETENT
COUNSEL.
Appellant alleges in Point II of her brief that
she received the assistance of ineffective counsel, and thus
her guilty plea was unknowing, ill advised, and mistaken.
She bases this assumption on the theory that counsel urged
her to change her plea to guilty in an effort to resolve
the case as expediously as possible and to avoid further
work, discomfort, and consumption of time.

It is of

extreme importance to emphasize that this theory propounded
by appellant is totally unsupported by any factual representation whatsoever in the record in this case.

What

appellant has done some four years after her plea was
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tendered is to finally recognize the inconvenience and
ramification of her irreputable life-style, and now
see::

to

vi~Jicate

her past through

by conjuring up all the

th~

legal proc2s3

arguments usually set forth

by those in her circumstance, one of these arguments being
that her counsel is to blame for her present "unjustified"
predicament.

Here again, appellant alleges that her coumcl

failed to uncover evidence which would have served as a basi<
for her defense.

This evidence is presented for the first

time in her brief, and is no where to be found in the record.
Such issues will be discussed more fully in respondent's
Points III and IV, infra.
Focusing specifically on the allegation by
appellant that her plea was involuntary because of ineffective
and incompetent counsel, and thus the trial court abused
its discretion in denying her motion to withdraw the plea,
Respondent calls the Court's attention to State v. Forsyth,
supra, at 560 P.2d 339, where the Court addressed a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel where a guilty plea was
involved:
~In this proceeding defendant
had the burden to persuade the
court that his counsel failed in
some manner to represent his
interests, which resulted in
prejudice to his defense, in
which burden he failed.
The motion
to withdraw a plea of guilty is
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addressed to the discretion of the
court; and as in all discretionary
matters, due to his prerogatives and his advantaged position, the
trial judge is allowed considerable
latitude in the exercise of that
discretion, \.1hich the appellate
court will not interfere with unless
it plainly appears that there was
abuse thereof.
On the basis of
the record before us and what has
been said herein, we are not
persuaded that there was any such
abuse of discretion."
It becomes evident from Forsyth, that:

(1) the burden

rests upon the defendant to show ineffective assistance of
counsel;

(2) if there is a failure to adequately represent

the interests of the defendant, such a'failure must result
in prejudice to the defense;

(J)

such failure to adequately

represent the defendant must appear

~

the record, and

not be merely an allegation by one, who having plead guilty,
now finds himself in distress.

Referring to the latter

technique, used quite frequently by those who find themselves
incarcerated following conviction, this Court said in the
Forsyth, opinion:
"In regard to the defendant's
contention that he was not accorded
the right to effective counsel, this
is to be said:
it is not at all
uncommon for one who finds himself
in such trouble as having been found
or pleaded guilty to a crime to turn
upon and impute fault to one who
has previously tried to assist him.
But the mere assertion of such a
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charge does not prove the fact.
This is especially so because the
assertion is suffused with such
self-interest that the trial court
is not bnund to believe it .
Id. at 339.
Respondent submits that appellant is one of the
many convicted to which the above quote is directed.
Appellant has not carried the burden showing that there has
been ".

. a flagrant abuse of legal procedure as to

amount to bad faith on the part of the lawyer."

Jaramillo

v. Turner,24 Utah 2d 19, ~65 P.2d 343 (1970); Forsvth, ~·
In State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203

(Utah 1976),

this Court again addressed the issue of effective

assiste~

of counsel and the burden incidental thereto on defendant
to show such:
"A defendant bears the burden of
establishing the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of counsel, and proof of
such must be a demonstrable reality
and not a speculative matter.
"
554 P.2d at 204.
(Emphasis added)
Respondent submits that appellant's allegations
are purely speculative, without foundation in or outside
of the record.

She entered the plea, represented by

competent counsel, and as such the plea must be deemed
intelligently entered, Guglielmetti v. Turner, supra, and
done with full knowlege of the facts and consequences
thereof.

State v. Mccallister, supra.
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Appellant seemed very willing at the time of trial
to enter a guilty plea in exchange for 60 days in jail and
probation thereafter.

The record indicates the plea was

entered following her being advised of her rights by Judge
Wahlquist (R. 13).

If such a plea was recommended by her

counsel, it certainly will fall within the "ambit of an
attorney's legitimate exercise of judgment as to the trial
tactics or strategy.
P.2d 205.

State v. McNicol, supra, at 554

What was said in McNicol is equally appropriate

in the present case, that being "there is no basis to hold
counsel so inept the proceedings become a farce or sham."
Id. 554 P.2d 205.

In the present case, the proceedings

were nothing other than orderly, and as such, respondent
submits that no ineffective assistance of counsel resulting
in prejudice to appellant's defense can be found in this
case, on or off the record.
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c.
THERE HAS BEEN NO SHO\\TING THAT
APPJ:: :,SANT' S PLEA \·,)AS THE PHODUCT
OF DURESS, COERCION, OR UNDUE
INFLUENCE.
Appellant, in Point III of her brief, alleges
that her guilty plea was elicited because of her selfimposed duress.

She alleges that this duress was the

result of her desires to bring her incarceration to an
end and "find out" what her sentence would be.

She also

alleges that because of her incarceration due to her
failure to obtain bond, she was unable to investigate the
facts leading to her arrest.
Respondent respectfully submits that these
are frivolous at best, and state no claim for relief.
simply are no facts to substantitate these
allegations.

cla~

The'.

claims--mere~

Even if there was a factual foundation on the

record to support appellant's allegations, there would be
no legal basis to sustain a finding that these

allegat~M

exerted undue influence to the point that her guilty plea
was the result of coercion.
Cases in which evidence has been presented
alluding to greater claims of coercion than in the present
case have been rejected by this Court:

Combs v. Turner,

25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P. 2d 437 <1971), where a husband plead•
guilty to free his wife from a felony charge, it was~~·
a Quinney
bargain
did Funding
not amount
toprovided
coercion;
Strong
v.andTurner,
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22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323 (1969), where defendant pleaded
guilty in ceturn for a promise by the prosecutor that remaining
charges would be dropped, it was held no coercion existed.
See also State v. Gutierrez, 20 Ariz.App. 337, 512 P.2d
869

(1973); and State v. Parle, 110 Ariz. 517, 521 P.2d 604

(197 4).
Appellant has alleged that she was precluded from
investigating her case because of her pre-trial incarceration.
She apparently bases this theory on an assumption that her
attorney could not or did not investigate her case.

If

this were the case, she should have moved the court for
appointment of new counsel after so advising the court of her
situation.

Such was not done, and the record gives no indica-

tion that it should have been.
It is apparent on the face of appellant's brief
that she experienced the normal anticipations and hopes of
most people who are faced with incarceration.

Such anxieties,

said this Court in State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976),
are not sufficient to invalidate guilty pleas:
• • • a mere subjective belief of a
defendant as to potential sentence, or hope
of leniency, unsupported by any promise from
the prosecutor or indication by the court,
is insufficient to invalidate a guilty plea
as involuntary or unknowing." 552 P.2d at 131.
By comparison, it should be noted that in the present case
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the prosecutor fulfilled appellant's hopes and desires by
recommending probation after the guilty plea was tendered,
Certainly appellant should not, four years after
her guilty plea, be allowed to claim that her plea was
involuntarily made because she wanted to "hurry up" and
find out the nature of her sentence.

Nor should she be

granted relief by merely alleging,without proof, that she
was precluded from investigating her case due to
tion.

incar~&

Such statements are self-serving allegations

unsupported by facts in the record, and as the Court
enunciated in Klotz v. Turner, 23 Utah 2d 303, 462 P.2d 705
(1969), form no basis for a finding that appellant's plea
was coerced:
"Lastly, Kloti says that the allegations
of his petition alone should entitle him to the
full treatment,-- • • • We think and hold that
under the Rule mentioned, its very language
eliminates such red-carpet treatment on the
sole ~ of one who has pleaded guilty and
obviously attempts some kind of detour from
his own voluntary admissions, and an
uncontradicted record, by simply shouting
'coercion,' with no legitimate proffer of
substance save his own contradictory gratuity."
462 P.2d at 706.
Respondent thus submits that appellant's allegati
regarding coercion of her plea are unfounded in the record
and should not be given credence by this Court.
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POINT III
APPELLANT'S ALLEGATIONS THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING HER MOTION
IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT AND FOR LEAVE TO
WITHDRAW HER PLEA OF GUILTY SHOULD NOT BE
CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT BECAUSE SUCH
ALLEGATIONS AND ANY FACTS TENDING TO SUPPORT
THEM ARE NOT CONTAINED IN THE RECORD.
Appellant has alleged that her guilty plea should
be withdrawn for several reasons, including allegations that
the plea was the product of coercion, undue influence and
duress; that she was provided ineffective assistance of
counsel; and that "new evidence" has been uncovered which
would have provided her a valid defense at trial.

There

are no facts in the record to support these allegations.
Facts referring to claims that appellant has uncovered "new
evidence" are merely conjecture and theory on her part,
with no substantiation in the record.

Issues related to

appellant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
and a guilty plea illicited through duress have been dealt
with previously.

However, no facts substantiating any of

these claims have been asserted or produced in the record
by appellant.

None of these issues were raised at the time

set for trial when her guilty plea was entered.

Suddenly,

four years later when appellant finds herself in danger
of being incarcerated again, these issues are raised for
the first time.
This court has held that it is not inclined to
reverse a condition on matters outside the record.
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State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912
(1965).

In Stat;o ,-. Kcls0y, 532 P"2d 1001

(Utah 197::;),

this Court said that it would not review a claim of errm
not raised in the lower court, except in some unusual
exigency where it is necessary to do so to rectify a
manifest injustice.

See also Jaramillo v. Turner, supra,

at 465 P.2d 344.
More specifically, it has been held time and
again by most courts in various states that factual
matters presented in briefs filed by defendants but not
found in the record

are

not entitled to consideration.

State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586, 503 P.2d 807 (1972);
People v. Strickland, 114 Cal.Rptr. 632, 11 Cal.3d 946,
523 P.2d 672 {1974); State v. Day, 7 Wash.App. 965, 503
P.2d 1098 (1972); McConnell v. People, 402 P.2d 75 (Colo.
1965).
Appellant has presented to this Court no reason
to go outside the record for the purpose of considering
those facts she has alleged in her brief but which are
not found in the record.

No "manifest injustice" has beer

shown,thus no need for rectification.

Respondent thus

submits that this Court is precluded from consideration

°'

those issues presented by appellant which are not supportc
by facts in the record itself.
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Appellant produced no transcript of the proceedings
at which the guilty plea was taken.

No witnesses were called

or evidence presented at the hearing four years later on the
motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

What was said was merely

a statement of theory propounded by the appellant.

Since

there is no transcript of the evidence in the proceedings
in which the guilty plea was taken, a presumption of
regularity and that the proceedings were carried on in
conformity with law exist.

Wheton v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 47,

497 P.2d 856, cert. denied, 94 s.ct. 81, 414 U.S. 862,
38 L.Ed.2d 112, reh. den. 94 s.ct. 1459, 415 u.s. 939, 39
L.Ed.2d 498.

There is thus no need for this Court to review

the proceedings below, and appellant's claim should be
dismissed without further consideration.
POINT IV
APPELLANT'S ALLEGED DEFENSES TO THE CRIME OF
OBTAINING MERCHANDISE BY FALSE PRETENSES ARE
NOT VALID NOR SHOULD THEY BE CONSIDERED ON
APPEAL.
In appellant's brief, a theory as to why she should
not be convicted as charged is presented.

Appellant also

alleges that the false credit application which she filled
out is not to be found.
Before addressing the merits of her claim,
respondent submits that by her plea of guilty, appellant
has admitted the existence of all of the elements of the

crimE'
ofQuinney
which
was
convicted,
thereby
waiving
the and Library Service
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_,,_

necessity for the taking of evidence, Farrow

v. Smith,

541 ?.2c"! 1107 (Utah 1975); CoP1bs v" Turner, supra; dnd
waiving the right to be convicted by proof beyond all
reasonable doubt.
(Wash. 1977).

State v. Tourtellotte, 564 P.2d 799

In Combs, this Court said:

"A plea of guilty dispenses with
the necessity of proof, and the issue
of innocence or guilt cannot here
be
relitigated any more than it
could be after a jury verdict of guilty."
483 P.2d at 439.
Appellant, by now asking this Court to overturn
the trial judge, thereby allowing a not guilty plea to be
entered and her "defense" presented, is in effect

aski~

this Court to hold that her unsubstantiated theory has
merit, thus having the effect of relitigating the
to which she pled guilty.

m~tter

This is contra to this Court's

thinking as well as other state courts.

The reason is

obvious, as stated by the Iowa Supreme Court in State v.
Rinehart, supra:
. • it may be observed that if
the mere fact that a defendant wh; has
pleaded guilty and been sentenced may
then be permitted to withdraw his plea
because he has, or claims to have, a
defense, he would then be permitted to
gamble on the sentence; and if it did
not please him, to demand a trial.
125 N.W.2d at 245.
A time lapse of more than four years has pass~
between the plea of guilty and sentencing, and the moti~
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to withdraw the guilty plea.

To require the State to

prosecute this case again and try it on its merits would
be grossly prejudicial to the State, particularly in
the area of locating witnesses and key documents.

Some

witnesses may have moved during the past four years, and
documents may have been misplaced or lost.
Assuming arguendo that appellant's alleged
defenses could be examined by this Court, respondent
submits that they are not persuasive.

Appellant argues

that the crime of obtaining merchandise by false pretenses
was not committed because the auto dealer assigned the
fraudulent finance agreement to the bank, and the victim,
therefore, lost nothing.

The logical extension of this

argument is that a thief could steal any item without
committing a crime as long as the owner was properly
insured, because the owner would be compensated for his
loss.

This argument is clearly without merit.
Appellant also claims that inasmuch as the car

was recovered and resold, the bank suffered no out of
pocket loss and the crime of false pretenses was not
committed.

Again, the extension of this argument is

that a thief commits no crime unless the stolen goods are
disposed of and the proceeds dissipated.

This argument

too is without merit.
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Finally, appellant argues that the fact that
some payments were made on the car, and that the car
was insured, conclusively demonstrates a lack of fraudulen:
intent.

These factors are probative of the petitioner's

intent, but they must be weighed against the fact that
the appellant did fill out a fraudulent credit

applic~~~

Unless the appellant intended to make payment in full at
the time the falsified application was made, she cannot
make out this defense.

Even on the facts as alleged by

appellant, it cannot be said that reasonable minds couM
not differ as to the appellant's intent.
Respondent submits that appellant's defense
theories are without merit and should not be considered.
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant's
petition should be dismissed for the following reasons:
(1) the motion in arrest of judgment and for leave to
withdraw a plea of guilty was untimely pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-24-3 (1953);

(2) the trial court, in denyin:

appellant's motion, did not abuse the discretion vested
in it by Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-3 (1953);

(3) appellant's

plea was intelligent and voluntary, and not illicited
through undue influence, coercion, or duress or ineffectiVi
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counsel;

(4) allegations by appellant are not

supported by facts contained in the record;

(5)

appellant's alleged defenses to the crime of obtaining
merchandise by false pretenses are not valid and should
not be considered on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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